AB S TRAC T. This Note examines whether state or federal principles of administrative law should govern suits challenging state agency action pursuant to cooperative federalism statutes. Despite the prevalence of cooperative federalism statutes, courts and scholars alike have given scant attention to this question. That neglect has translated into poorly reasoned and inconsistent judicial decisions. We show that this question is one of federal common law that is properly governed by the framework of Kimbell Foods, which holds that federal common law should take state law as its substantive source unless doing so would create a significant conflict with federal policy.
INTRODUCTION
Administrative law scholarship focuses almost exclusively on federal agencies implementing federal laws.' Yet state agency implementation of federal statutes -cooperative federalism -is an integral part of our administrative state in fields ranging from environmental law to health care to education.
3 When state agencies are sued for violating cooperative federalism statutes they administer, courts must decide what doctrines of administrative law should apply. Does federal or state law control? If federal, should these agencies be treated like their federal counterparts, or must new rules be developed to accommodate the unique issues posed by state agencies? 'significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state In this Note, we begin by presenting background on the history of cooperative federalism statutes, the role of cooperative federalism today, and the sources of administrative law. We then argue that the APA never considered the role of state agencies in implementing federal law and examine the inconsistent and reflexive way in which courts have applied administrative law to state agencies implementing cooperative federalism statutes. Finally, we explain how these issues can be better resolved and understood through the Kimbell Foods framework.
I. LEGISLATIVE SILENCE AND JUDICIAL CHAOS

A. Cooperative Federalism and Administrative Law
The archetypal federal program involves federal agencies implementing federal statutory law. But federal statutes that delegate responsibility to state agencies make up a large and important part of the United States Code.
Although some cooperative federalism statutes, such as the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, existed prior to the New Deal," it was the New Deal that "put the concept of a cooperative federalism on the map."', Most cooperative federalism statutes passed during this period generally "involved the sharing of funding, as opposed to regulatory authority" between the federal and state governments.
9 By 1938, so-called grants-in-aid programs were already providing funding for such diverse projects as "agricultural extension work in the states, the training of teachers [of certain subjects], . . . experiments in reforestation, the construction of highways, the equipment and training of the National Guard, and other matters falling normally under the reserved powers of the states." Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) 2o. Koenig, supra note 17, at 756-57 (footnotes omitted).
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In other programs, the federal government explicitly enlisted state agencies to carry out federal statutes." Even prior to the New Deal, the federal government used state governmental actors to assist in the "apprehension of fugitives from justice, the enforcement of the National Prohibition Act, [and] public health administration."" The New Deal considerably expanded the reach of these types of programs. 3 Perhaps most significantly, the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 substantively involved state commissioners in much of the administration of motor carrier regulation.
Still, the dominant regulatory model of the New Deal involved "national bureaucracies directly regulat [ing] citizens and businesses in support of national policies."" Programs involving cooperative federalism were seen as "striking" experiments rather than the norm.26 According to one commentator, the cooperative aspect of the Motor Carrier Act "would not have been feasible and could scarcely have commended itself to congressional approval had not the plan been solidly grounded on vital facts peculiar to the motor carrier industry."1 achieved without a "corresponding increase in national administration of regulatory and service-provision programs," because ground-level implementation of regulatory responsibilities under these statutes was generally left to the states. 9 In many of these areas, federal laws encroached on traditional areas of state regulation. 3 o Thus, federal statutes frequently incorporated state regulators as a way of softening the increased role of the federal government. Other statutes regulated new areas, but used states as an efficient means of ensuring adequate and localized enforcement.
Congress continues to vigorously employ cooperative federalism structures. For example, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires state agencies to oversee interconnection agreements between telecommunications utilities according to federal standards. 2 The most important statute in many years, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), is an even more prominent example of a federal program engaging state agencies in cooperative regulation. Cooperative federalism has been called the "dominant model for federal environmental statutes," 3 4 and it is used in "such disparate programs as Medicaid, OSHA, public utilities regulation, law enforcement licensure, online Because state agency authority is rarely revoked once given, it appears that cooperative federalism will only become more widespread with time. 6 Cooperative federalism statutes make up such a large portion of the law that any analysis of federal administrative law excluding them would be incomplete.
Cooperative federalism is a broad category, with statutes distributing responsibility between federal and state agencies in many different ways. For our purposes, it may help to categorize cooperative federalism programs into one of three stylized types, in order of increasing federal predominance: (i) state agencies implementing state law subject to federal requirements and oversight; (2) state agencies implementing state law, side-by-side with federal law, subject to federal requirements and oversight; and (3) state agencies implementing purely federal law, acting as a kind of contractor for the federal program.
In the first category, the cooperative federalism statute offers state agencies federal funding with strings attached. For example, the state might be required to enact laws and regulations that meet certain specifications and make reports to a federal agency tasked with supervision. Thus, in this category, state agencies implement state law, which is shaped by federal law. This type of statute is common in benefits programs, 37 In the third category, exemplified by Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), state agencies implement exclusively or nearly exclusively federal law using federal funding. For these programs, state agencies act almost as contractors carrying out a federal mission. 4 s This variety in cooperative federalism programs is part of the reason that a nuanced, flexible rule modeled on Kimbell Foods is appropriate. As we shall explore infra Section II.B, the goals and organizational structure of some cooperative federalism programs will argue for more use of federal administrative law, while others will argue for more state administrative law. But in discussing these differences, we should not lose sight of the fact that all cooperative federalism programs subject state agencies to federal requirements that they would not otherwise face and present a question of whether administrative law principles should be uniform across the nation or state specific.
B. The Law Today
The Hole in the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative law has long had many sources: substantive statutes,4 6 agency organic statutes, 7 the common law and equity powers of the courts,4 agency practice and regulation, and the Constitution." In 1946, Congress added another source: the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which codified federal administrative law into one comprehensive framework that applies by default to all programs and agencies.so Constitutional constraints on the administrative state, such as the Due Process Clause, apply to state and federal agencies alike. Agency-specific requirements, meanwhile, can fairly be read to apply only to the agency they concern. One can imagine a world in which Congress would have written the APA to encompass state agencies administering federal programs. But, despite the fact that state agencies play a vital role in the administration of federal law, they are conspicuously left out of the APA. Under the APA, "agency" is defined only as including "each authority of the Government of the United States."s' As a result, the APA's rules regarding "agencies" simply do not apply to state agencies." Although federal statutes that relied on state agency implementation 46. The Clean Air Act, for example, articulates a series of steps for how state and federal agencies must proceed in establishing ambient air quality standards. 
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Third, the cooperative federalism statute at issue must be silent on which law should apply. 75 As in all administrative law contexts, if the language of a statute prescribes specific procedures, or a specific choice of law, then the text of the statute usually governs authoritatively. But that is more a theoretical bar to courts facing this question than a real one, because as discussed above, it is rare for cooperative federalism statutes to specify which law should apply to state agencies.
While none of these factors can entirely explain away the curious failure of courts and commentators to address this question, they may have led to a fragmenting of the doctrine that has made the issue more difficult to spot. The question can arise under many statutes and, within a given statutory context, will only sometimes be decisive. As a result, courts have addressed the question in a haphazard manner rather than in an organized line of cases. In fact, courts usually do not recognize the question of what law to apply at all. Perhaps they sense that there is something there, but especially without proper briefing, it is easier to ignore it. Meanwhile, since litigants have no case law to brief, they may find it not worth their time to construct a whole new theory of administrative law.
Courts' Discussion of the Doctrine
There are two main contexts in which courts face the question of whether to apply state or federal administrative law: the standard of review for agency action and the deference due to agency interpretations of statutes. Most courts do not raise the question of which body of law should apply. Instead, they apply the law that is most familiar to them. Federal courts generally apply federal law to state agencies without considering whether state law might apply; rather, they focus their inquiry on how to apply federal principles to state agencies.' 6 State courts, by contrast, tend to apply state administrative lav without considering whether federal law might apply.
7
In practice, then, the law today depends on the forum. State agencies are treated differently depending on whether they appear in state or federal court.' This does violence to two of Erie's goals, "discouragement of forum- 
78.
One interesting question is whether litigants know this and behave strategically.
1295
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws."" Furthermore, in this chaotic regime, the federal courts give too little consideration to the value of comity toward state law, while the state courts give too little consideration to potentially significant conflicts with the ultimately overriding demands of federal law. This pattern also provides insight into the debate in the federal courts literature about parity.8o Our research shows that, at least in this area of administrative law, state courts are not as solicitous of federal law as are the federal courts. Yet this does not mean that state courts are necessarily any more wrong than federal courts -here, both are insufficiently mindful of the other sovereign's law.
i. Standard ofReview for State Agency Actions
The federal APA specifies a number of standards by which courts should review agency action. The two most prominent standards are the substantial evidence test," used to review formal adjudication and formal rulemaking, and the arbitrary and capricious test," used for agency factfinding in informal proceedings. While there is legitimate debate about the difference between these standards," there is a general recognition that the federal courts have moved from a deferential approach to a more scrutinizing, "hard look" review of agency action. substantial evidence standard, case law may interpret the phrase "substantial evidence" differently.
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Despite these differences, federal courts often apply federal standards to state agency actions without acknowledging state doctrine at all. 5 9 Some federal courts have applied the federal substantial evidence standard of review to state agency actions, while others apply an arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 9 0 Most circuits have done so without discussing why they are applying the standard they do, instead merely citing authority from other courts. 91 However, some courts have discussed the issue more substantively. In GTE South, Inc. v. Morrison, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that because the federal APA does not apply to state agencies, "the standards provided by that act are not directly applicable." 92 Nevertheless, it concluded that "[a]bsent a statutory command, general standards for judicial review of agency action apply." 93 The court appeared to justify its choice of a substantial evidence Courts applying the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard have sometimes justified the choice by pointing to the state agency's technical expertise in applying the law. 95 In addition, when federal and state agencies act together to carry out a federal statute, courts have cited the combination of federal approval and state experience carrying out the statute as a reason to use arbitrary and capricious review.96
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Significantly, courts discussing the issue very rarely take state doctrine into account." The opinion in GTE South illustrates the way many federal courts reflexively apply federal law without inquiring into state doctrine. The GTE South court applied the federal substantial evidence standard, which it described as "consistent with our precedent concerning federal judicial review of state-agency decisions.",8 However, the opinion it cited as precedent used the substantial evidence test not because that was a blanket federal standard that should apply, but rather because it determined that the state standard should control, and North Carolina, the state in question, used the substantial evidence test as its standard. 9 9 Yet GTE South, which concerned a decision by the Virginia State Corporation Commission, applied the federal substantial evidence standard based on this precedent without ever inquiring into Virginia law."oo It thus twisted prior precedent into a uniform federal rule in favor of 94. Id. ("The substantial evidence standard is, by the way, the same standard we would apply in cases where arbitration under the Act is conducted by the FCC, rather than a state utilities commission."). State court deference frameworks may be significantly different from federal ones. As mentioned above, state courts generally follow the weak deference model. 9 Some states differ even more. Utah, for example, grants "little or no deference" to agency determinations, and has applied this standard to cooperative federalism statutes. 3 o A number of states explicitly take account of agency expertise and other contextual factors in determining the appropriate level of deference. In California, for instance, " [d] eference to administrative interpretations always is situational and depends on a complex of factors ... , but where the agency has special expertise and its decision is carefully considered by senior agency officials, that decision is entitled to correspondingly greater weight."' In New York, the level of deference depends on whether "the interpretation or application of a statute involves specialized knowledge and understanding of underlying operational practices or entails an evaluation of factual data, within the expertise of the agency administering the statute," in which case great deference is granted, or whether "the question is one of pure statutory interpretation," in which case no deference is granted. ' In Wisconsin, "[t] he weight that is due an agency's interpretation of the law depends on the comparative institutional capabilities and qualifications of the court and the administrative agency."' Despite this potential divergence, when the Fourth Circuit declared that "an order of a state commission may deserve a measure of respect in view of the commission's experience [and] expertise, and the role that Congress has given it in the Telecommunications Act," it decided that the best way to accord that respect was to grant the state agency Skidmore deference, without even considering whether the best way to accord it respect would be to grant it the deference normally due the agency under state law. 4 
95.
127.
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Note that in many cases it is not clear whether the state is interpreting state law, federal law, or both. For example, in Brazoria County v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, the plaintiff challenged "several rules and orders" of a State Implementation Plan developed pursuant to the Clean Air Act.' In that case, the majority of the plaintiffs challenges were based entirely on state law, but some of the causes of action depended on the resolution of federal law. In other cases, the state law at issue may be a state statute, regulation, or plan created pursuant to a federal statute."'
iii. Other Doctrines
This pattern, in which federal courts consider only federal law, recurs when federal courts apply most other administrative law doctrines to state agencies implementing federal law.
One prominent example is the doctrine flowing from Heckler v. Chaney's holding that a federal agency's decision not to bring an enforcement action is presumptively unreviewable in court."' One district court held that, because Chaney and its ilk flow from the APA, and the APA does not apply to state agencies, those cases do not apply to state agencies."' As a result, the court held that the state agency's action was reviewable. Oddly, however, the court did not consider whether state administrative law doctrines similar to Chaney might make the state agency's action unreviewable.1 3 9 in a similar case, the 8 The court explained that because state law was not "explicitly on point," the MPUC had been forced to fashion a new rule for the burden of proof.' 9 Ultimately, the court accepted the MPUC's conclusion because it felt it was reasonably consistent with the principles of both federal common law and Minnesota common law. ' The Supreme Court itself discussed the issue of how to treat state agencies applying federal law in Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast,s' 5 which considered the burden of proof in a state hearing before an administrative law judge under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The administrative law judge had ruled in favor of a school district on the grounds that the evidence was close and the parents bore the burden of persuasion. The parents then challenged the result through a civil action in federal district court, as provided for by the IDEA."s 2 Since the statute was silent on the issue, the Court applied the default federal rule. "Absent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise, therefore, we will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief."' 3 The respondent school district and several state amici argued that, rather than applying the federal rule, the Court should defer to state law.' 54 Although other states had issued statutes or regulations covering the matter, the Court reasoned that " [b] Justice Breyer's dissent suggests a way that courts can apply administrative law to cooperative federalism statutes while taking account of the demands of both federal and state law. In Part II, we develop this framework.
II. ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
As we have demonstrated, courts have not adequately considered what law should apply to state agencies challenged under cooperative federalism statutes. But what should their answer be? In principle, the courts could take three different types of approaches: (1) adopt a blanket rule applying either federal or state law; (2) adopt a presumption in favor of either federal or state law that could be overridden by considerations specific to the statutory regime and administrative law doctrine at issue; or (3) adopt no general rule or presumption and instead focus entirely on the contextual factors of the statute and administrative law doctrine at issue. In this Part, we first show that the teachings of federal common law and the principles of practical governance they embody point toward a version of the second option in which courts presume that state law applies but engage in a contextual analysis to determine whether this presumption would create a significant conflict with federal policy. We then explore what this approach would look like in practice. Finally, we conclude with questions for further research.
At the outset, we note that the question of what law courts should apply in the absence of congressional direction is a separate question from what direction Congress should give. Courts are forced to determine the choice-of-law question for themselves because Congress has mostly been silent, but Congress could decide to speak. Since Congress generally has not done so, we suggest a framework for how courts should proceed in the face of current ambiguity.
1308
157. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 70-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Clearfield first clearly established that federal courts have authority to craft federal common law in such circumstances, and that in doing so they may either fill gaps with state law or craft uniform federal rules."' In Clearfield, the Court had to decide what law should govern a suit by the United States to recover the value of a stolen check that had been issued by the Treasury. The Court held that state law did not apply directly through Erie because "[t]he authority to issue the check had its origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and was in no way dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania or of any other state."io Thus, " [t] he duties imposed upon the United States and the rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their roots in the same federal sources.",, 6 ' These federal duties, combined with the "absence of an applicable Act of Congress," gave the federal courts authority to make federal common law-that is, "to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.",, 6 ' But while the legal question was inherently federal, the Clearfield Court noted that courts were free to borrow the substantive rule from state law.
6 , Clearfield itself declined that invitation, observing that the need for uniformity in the law governing federal commercial paper made it inappropriate to borrow law from the various states. U.S. 677, 690 (20o6) ("Clearfield is indeed a pathmarking precedent on the authority of federal courts to fashion uniform federal common law on issues of national concern.").
16o. Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 366.
Id.
162.
Id. at 367.
Id.
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The general framework of Clearfield has held up over time. 6s But its emphasis on uniformity has been met with withering criticism. As Paul Mishkin has pointed out, federal common law is unlikely to result in true uniformity because the Supreme Court can review so few of the cases heard in the appellate courts.'
66 Moreover, while uniformity may matter for particular legislative problems, "not infrequently the call for 'uniformity' seems basically to represent a desire for symmetry of abstract legal principles and a revolt against the complexities of a federated system of government.", 6 , Perhaps most importantly, by imposing a uniform rule for federal commercial paper, the Court in Clearfield missed a competing uniformity: that of banking transactions within a specific state.' 6 8 Under Clearfield, citizens of any given state were forced to operate under two different banking systems with different rules, one involving federal notes and one involving state notes.
In light of these problems, the Court found a different solution to a similar situation in Kimbell Foods. Faced with the question of how to resolve lien priority for liens stemming from federal programs, the Court reasoned that "a national rule is unnecessary to protect the federal interests underlying the [federal] loan programs."
170 Instead it declared that, "absent a congressional directive to the contrary," the lien priorities would be "determined under nondiscriminatory state laws." 17 ' The Court made clear that this sort of reasoning would apply more generally: absent "concrete reasons" to the 165. Martha A. Field has criticized the two-step inquiry of Clearfield, in which courts first determine whether they have the authority to craft federal common law, and second determine whether that law should take federal or state law as its source. The Court has subsequently elaborated on the Kimbell Foods presumption in favor of state law. The ultimate question is "whether the relevant federal interest warrants displacement of state law."'" There is a "presumption that state law should be incorporated into federal common law" as the federal rule of decision.'
74 Only in limited instances should courts "fill the interstices of federal remedial schemes with uniform federal rules." 7 Cases meriting the "judicial creation of a special federal rule . . . are . . . 'few and restricted,' [and] limited to situations where there is a 'significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law.'"" 6 Thus, through Kimbell Foods and subsequent cases, the Court established a general set of ground rules that call for a presumption in favor of state law when creating federal common law.
As with the federal loan program at issue in Kimbell Foods, cooperative federalism statutes create situations where "[g]overnment activities 'arise from and bear heavily upon a federal program."" 77 Likewise, in many situations, they "'require' otherwise than that state law govern of its own force.""7 Admittedly, cooperative federalism cases sound in public law, whereas the Kimbell Foods cases sounded in tort, contract, and property -private law. However, as we will show, Kimbell Foods makes sense in the public law context, too. It teaches that courts should adopt state law unless doing so presents a significant conflict with federal policy. 
B. The Value ofthe Kimbell Foods Presumption in the Cooperative Federalism Context
In the previous Section, we explained why, doctrinally, Kimbell Foods governs what law should apply when state agencies are sued for violations of cooperative federalism statutes. This Section explains why the Kimbell Foods rule-a presumption in favor of state law-is also desirable. Here, as in the core Kimbell Foods cases, state law will usually be most appropriate, but there will be cases in which applying state law would undermine the policy objectives behind the statute in question. Courts should adopt a middle ground in which they presume that state law governs but adopt federal law when doing otherwise would present a significant conflict with federal policy.
A blanket rule for state law would too often do violence to compelling federal interests, while a blanket rule for federal law would too often do violence to state interests. Blanket rules would also be blind to the tremendous variety of cooperative federalism statutes and questions of law. In contrast, a totally flexible, contextual inquiry with no presumption would undermine consistency and predictability in the law while ignoring the fact that state law is more often appropriate. In this Section, we first explain why cooperative federalism regimes should mostly use state law. Second, we explain why that tendency should not be so strong as to become a blanket rule.
Why Cooperative Federalism Should Lean Toward State Law
Kimbell Foods has been developed in the private law context and calls for a presumption in favor of state law in part because application of a federal rule might "disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law."' 79 So why should the same presumption apply in the public law context of cooperative federalism, where bargaining reliance is rarely an issue?"o We suggest four reasons.
First, state agencies, just like business entities, expect to operate under a uniform and predictable set of rules. For example, if a state agency has structured its quasijudicial processes (e.g., how it gathers evidence) to meet a state "soft look" review rather than federal "hard look" review, the agency would either have to change its processes when federal issues were at stake, or it would see its federally inflected decisions struck down at a higher rate. 18o. Some disputes between private parties might turn on the legality of agency action, and in those cases bargaining reliance could be relevant. Predictability could be an issue too, since sometimes it is not clear whether an agency is acting in its purely state capacity or in its cooperative federalism capacity. If the agency cannot predict what law will govern judicial review of its cooperative federalism actions, it will not be able to structure its processes intelligently. Moreover, when a state agency acts pursuant to both federal and state law, as is often the case, it could be subject to two separate and potentially conflicting standards for the same action, depending on whether plaintiffs sued under the state or the federal law. Second, it is reasonable to assume that state courts and legislatures, in developing administrative law doctrines to oversee their agencies, have taken the characteristics of their agencies into account in a way that uniform federal rules could not. For example, in a state with a notoriously corrupt or incompetent public utilities commission, or just a poor civil service generally, the state legislature or courts may have developed a stricter standard of review, whereas a state whose appointment rules lead to a well-respected commission may be more deferential. State deference doctrine may also take account of internal variation in state institutions. In a number of states, deference doctrine explicitly takes into account contextual factors such as the role of agency expertise and senior agency officials in the decision.'' This flexible deference standard may be a wise adaptation to the varying quality of agency action that those state courts have seen over the years. (Of course, it could also be a similarly wise course for the federal courts to adopt with respect to federal agencies.) Another good reason for state deference doctrine to differ from federal deference doctrine is that the heads of state agencies are often directly elected by the people, and therefore directly accountable to them, while the heads of federal agencies are never elected."' As a result, the courts may need to play less of a role in checking potentially arbitrary administrative action. In the face of carefully considered state adaptations, the federal government would be wise not to impose federal rules -which are adapted for a different set of institutions -unless there is a strong case for such interference.
Third, the Constitution values the independence of state institutions. Thus, "Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program" nor "circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's officers."'" In fact, state interests are at their height when the governance of Once a lawful cooperative federalism program is in place, a state cannot claim some sovereign freedom from federal direction. But the deference due to state institutions is a constitutional value that should not disappear from the picture. Courts should give it real weight when deciding whether to adopt state or federal law. And, in this context, this value holds greater sway than in the situation originally contemplated by the Kimbell Foods line of cases, because it involves control over state institutions rather than simply state laws. The presumption that state principles usually govern challenges to state agency action while federal principles govern challenges to federal agency action respects the importance of both state and federal governments in cooperative federalism programs. And it respects the legislative intent of both elected bodies by allowing legislatures to specify principles of review that govern the agencies they create.
Fourth, congressional silence may itself indicate an intent for state law to apply. In United States v. Standard Oil Co., which provided much of the foundation for Kimbell Foods, the Court reasoned that "it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed."' 90 Since state agency actions are ordinarily governed by state law, the absence of any language governing state agencies in the APA and Congress's continued silence can be interpreted as another example of this form of acquiescence. Of course, this argument should not be taken too far -since Congress will often not have noticed an issue, its silence should not be dispositive when purposive reasons are to the contrary."' But Congress's silence should strengthen the presumption in favor of state law, especially as recognition of this issue grows.
Why Not a Blanket Rule in Favor of State Law?
Why not always adopt state administrative law as the rule of decision? Again, the Kimbell Foods line of cases provides an answer: sometimes, applying state law will present "a significant conflict" with a "federal policy or interest."' 2 For example, if state deference doctrine allows agencies such wide latitude in interpretation that giving them that deference would mean dramatically different interpretations in different states, and the statutory regime in question strongly demands uniformity, then state deference doctrine may need to be displaced by deference doctrine shaped in the federal courts. The courts should not use their common law powers to adopt state administrative law that would undermine a statute duly enacted by Congress.
One could argue in favor of a clear statement rule: if Congress wants federal administrative law to govern state administrative agencies, it should have to say so explicitly. But this is unreasonable. First, until this Note was written, the issue was simply not recognized, so we cannot say that Congress was on notice or that Congress definitively meant anything through its silence. Second, going forward, Congress could not possibly anticipate every situation in which this question might arise. A judicially created blanket rule would either force judges to apply state law in a manner contrary to how Congress would have spoken if it had thought of the issue, or it would encourage Congress to create a default rule of its own -but there is no good reason for the courts to so pressure the legislature.
We have shown that it will often be important for state law to govern, but also that federal law must be supreme where state law presents a significant conflict with federal policy. Of course, what it means to present a significant conflict with federal policy is not at all obvious on its face. In the next Section, we draw on the Kimbell Foods line of cases to flesh out that concept in the context of cooperative federalism.
C. How Kimbell Foods Should Work in the Cooperative Federalism Context
Under the Kimbell Foods framework, there are three main ways in which a federal policy may warrant displacement of state law:
[1] the scheme in question evidences a distinct need for nationwide legal standards, or when [2] express provisions in analogous statutory schemes embody congressional policy choices readily applicable to the matter at hand ... [or when] [3] "application of the particular state law in question would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs."
We discuss these sources of conflict in turn.
Uniformity
The first exception to the presumption in favor of state law applies where there is a "distinct need for nationwide legal standards." 94 But that need must truly be distinct-courts will "reject generalized pleas for uniformity." 95 Today's Supreme Court is often dismissive of uniformity arguments, calling uniformity "that most generic (and lightly invoked) of alleged federal interests.",I9 6 Even cases involving federal government contracts no longer automatically merit uniform federal rules. 97 Moreover, for a federal policy to be a "genuinely identifiable" one meriting a uniform federal rule, it cannot be "judicially constructed,",9 8 because "'[w]hether latent federal power should be 20 1 Congress's choice to involve state agencies in its regulatory scheme shows a desire, or at least a willingness, for implementation to vary according to the preferences and characteristics of state institutions and interests.20 Cooperative federalism regimes often grant state agencies wide latitude in implementation. As Philip Weiser has observed, "the very point of cooperative federalism schemes ... is to allow states to adopt the approach that they deem to be the optimal regulatory strategy . . . whenever the statutory scheme authorizes them to make that decision in the first instance." 20 3
Still, even in the cooperative federalism context, there will be situations that cry out for a uniform federal rule. Ultimately, the judgment must be specific to the matter presented before the court. 0 4 The specifics of both the cooperative federalism regime and the type of agency action will be relevant.
As discussed earlier, the relative importance of state versus federal law varies tremendously among cooperative federalism programs. When state agencies implement state law subject to federal requirements and oversight, as in the case of many benefits, public housing, and education programs, ("But Congress, in permitting local taxation of the real property, made it impossible to apply the law with uniform tax consequences in each state and locality. For the several States, and even the localities within them, have diverse methods of assessment, collection, and refunding.").
2o. Weiser, supra note 5, at 36. Of course, the decision to use a cooperative federalism regime does not necessarily mean that Congress was opposed to centralized authority. Other factors may have been relevant. For example, Congress may have decided that there was no federal agency already in existence with the ability to implement the program in full, and that creating a new agency or increasing the capacity of an existing agency was not worth the gains in uniformity.
202. Id.
Id.
204. This is in accord with Gluck's suggestion of a statute-specific approach to determining whether state agencies should receive Chevron deference. "The extent to which one might recommend deferring to state agency interpretations of federal law, for example, likely should turn on why Congress uses the state agency implementers in the first place." Gluck, supra note 4, at 565.
Congress has probably already given up on true uniformity.os By contrast, when state agencies operate entirely according to federal law and with federal funding, as in the case of SSDI, Congress has prioritized uniformity. In more hybrid regimes such as workplace safety and environmental programs, state agencies implement federal law directly, often side-by-side with state law.2os These will be the hardest cases, requiring a more detailed look at the importance of uniformity to the program and how uniformity would be affected by the adoption of a state rule in the particular administrative law doctrine in question. The demand for uniformity may even vary within a regulatory regime, if some parts rely more heavily on state implementation than others.o 7 The more local an issue is, the less it will demand uniformity. Ideally, Congress will have emphasized state law in areas where an issue is more local and federal law where the issue is more regional or national. For example, the vast majority of education funding, policy, and practice is determined by state and local governments.2os If the burden of persuasion in proceedings under the IDEA were determined by state law, as Justice Breyer proposed in Schaffer,2 9 that would be just a tiny sliver of state law's predominance in education -and since our educational policy accepts the dominant role of state government, state administrative law doctrines would rarely present any significant conflict with federal policy. By contrast, federal laws governing environmental pollution partly seek to create a consistent set of rules for businesses in a national marketplace and to avoid races to the bottom between states, so uniformity is more important. The strength of the demand for uniformity will also depend on the administrative law doctrine in question. It should rarely be necessary to displace state law and create uniform federal rules regarding the standard of review of a state agency action involving the application of law to fact. Recall the standard of review cases discussed supra Subsection I.B.3. In many of these, federal courts were reviewing the decision of a state public utilities commission on whether an interconnection agreement between two telecommunications providers met the requirements of the Telecommunications Act. While the Act may demand uniformity in some areas, it is hard to imagine how it would demand uniformity in the standard of review applied to state public utility commission decisions. After all, other differences between state commissions will do much more to create diversity in the law's application. Different agencies will have different compositions, expertise, policy goals, institutional cultures, staffing resources, and procedures, to name but a few salient distinctions. If Congress accepted these differences by setting up a cooperative federalism scheme, it is hard to claim that different standards of review are a bridge too far. In fact, given the differences between state agencies, it may well be wise for federal courts to use the standards that state courts have adopted to oversee their administrative agencies."
By contrast, deference doctrine will often demand uniformity. As discussed supra Subsection I.B.3, federal courts generally do not give state agencies deference when interpreting federal law. If state law were applied to grant greater deference, it would widen the range of permissible statutory interpretations, such that the same statutory text could mean substantially different things in California and Kansas. Statutory interpretation occurs at a higher level of generality than the application of law to facts and therefore has greater policy implications. Where Congress seeks to create uniform national standards, for example, in order to ease compliance costs for businesses or to avoid races to the bottom by state agencies, such diversity of law could pose a significant conflict with a federal policy. In addition, we generally assume that the same text from the same authority should mean the same thing to different implementers. Maintaining that assumption here would be entirely reasonable.
That said, whether a diversity of interpretations would actually lead to a significant conflict with federal policy sufficient to displace state law will depend on the statutory regime in question. If the IDEA were interpreted somewhat differently in different states, that would probably be fine -there is 
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Here, "standards" should be read to mean both formal standards -arbitrary and capricious, substantial evidence, etc. -and the case law that gives those standards content and meaning.
1319 already a tremendous difference in the education disabled children receive, so it is difficult to justify a hard stand for uniformity in interpretation. But if environmental emissions laws were interpreted differently, it would undermine the creation of a nationwide marketplace.m' Some commentators have argued for giving state agencies deference under a federal standard. 13 But the application of a federally imposed standard of deference does not evince the respect for state institutions that Kimbell Foods teaches. Rather, Kimbell Foods teaches that such respect, where it does not conflict with a federal policy, entails the adoption of state law to determine the deference due state agencies. In some cases, this might mean little deference is granted. In general, state law grants state agencies weak deference, not the strong Chevron deference that federal law grants federal agencies."' Utah, for example, gives its agencies "little or no deference." 21 s A uniform federal deference standard would, in at least some cases, grant state agencies more deference than that to which they would be entitled under state law. This would run counter to states' ability to set standards for their own agencies, incentivize the agencies to act pursuant to federal rather than state law, and perversely imply that state agencies are more authoritative interpreters of federal law than of state law.
Moreover, it is hard to imagine a need for uniformity sufficient to displace state law that would simultaneously allow the creation of a federally sourced rule granting deference to state agencies. After all, where uniformity is needed, what is needed is not uniformity in deference standards per se, but rather uniformity in the interpretation of substantive law. Thus, the appropriate choice is whether to invoke federal law to grant no deference, invoke federal law to limit state law-based deference, or apply state deference law in all its variegated ways.
Applying Rather, it may be appropriate to adopt a federal rule "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking." 2 " DelCostello is a relatively soft precedent. It does not call for the displacement of relevant state law, but rather for the adoption of more relevant analogous federal law over less relevant analogous state law. In most administrative law cases, there will be relevant state and federal law on point, so DelCostello will have no force.
But the use of analogous federal statutes does not end with DelCostello. Another case, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., suggests that courts should use the policies embedded in analogous federal statutes to preempt and displace relevant state law. 225 In Boyle, the father of a Marine helicopter pilot who was killed in a crash brought a tort suit for defective design and repair against the manufacturer of the helicopter. The Court held that the federal interest in setting the terms of the military's contracts with its manufacturers preempted the operation of state law, and that the appropriate choice of substantive law was federal, not state law. The Court cited the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) as an analogous statute creating a federal policy that the government should not be liable for " [a] failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty,",,, 6 and that "the selection of the appropriate design for military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function within the meaning of this provision.""' The Court concluded that "'second-guessing' of these judgments . .. through state tort suits against contractors would produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption," because " [t] he financial burden of judgments against the contractors would ultimately be passed through, substantially if not totally, to the United States itself."" Thus, state tort law "present[ed] a 'significant conflict' with federal policy and must be displaced.""'
Boyle stands for a muscular use of analogous federal law to shove aside state law. However, we should be cautious in extending Boyle, as military cases often present distinctive concerns and stretch the limits of available doctrine. 23 o That said, in certain cases, state law might create sufficiently significant conflicts with federal policies embodied in analogous federal statutes, such as the APA, to warrant displacement of state law.
The primary federal policy expressed in the APA is that government action is generally subject to judicial review to ensure that it accords with law. Federal law contains a "strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action."23 "From the beginning 'our cases have established that judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Frustration of a federal scheme could be the basis for using federal administrative law in cooperative federalism regimes. For example, if the use of state law would frustrate the environmental goals of the Clean Air Act, federal law should govern. The analysis here will be context specific, with the broader admonition that cooperative federalism regimes invite variation in implementation in a way that unified federal regimes do not, so that what might be frustration in a unified federal regime might be par for the course in the cooperative federalism context.
CONCLUSION
This Note has posed the difficult question of what law should apply when state agencies are alleged to have violated cooperative federalism statutes. Though the courts have largely ignored the question and reflexively applied the law with which they are most familiar, federal common law has already explained what law should apply when federal law is silent. The answer is that state law should apply unless doing so creates a significant conflict with federal policy. We have shown that, though this answer comes from the context of private law, it is also compelling, on both doctrinal and normative grounds, in the context of cooperative federalism.
The strength of the Kimbell Foods framework is that it allows for some measure of predictability while at the same time not oversimplifying the issues at stake. Of course, extending Kimbell Foods to the new domain of cooperative federalism raises new issues. One of the most important tasks for courts and commentators is to organize our understanding of cooperative federalism statutes and administrative law doctrines to give meaningful guidance to The argument in favor of state law will be strongest where federal law delegates substantial responsibility to state authorities and calls for implementation through the passage of state laws. It will be weakest when it calls for state agencies to directly apply federal law and delegates minimal responsibility to them. Probative factors may include whether the cooperative federalism regime grants state agencies substantial policy or enforcement discretion; whether state programs predated federal programs and federal legislation evinces a desire to layer on top of rather than displace those programs; and whether funding is largely or primarily a state or local concern. In addition, cooperative federalism laws that give state and federal agencies overlapping implementation responsibilities invite less state autonomy than laws that clearly delegate sole responsibility for implementation to the states.
Other aspects of cooperative federalism laws may affect the deference due state law in more complicated ways. ' For example, some cooperative federalism laws create federal floors or ceilings, often enforced by the threat of federal backstop authority -does this make a program more or less demanding of uniformity?4 7 Statutes also delegate to a broad range of "state" actors, some of whom may merit more deference than others."' Some even delegate 246. Gluck, supra note 4, at 550 ("This literature also has viewed 'cooperative federalism' as an undifferentiated category, when in fact there is much diversity within this category with respect to how exactly these schemes are designed.").
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See Buzbee, supra note 245, at 1555 (discussing federal floors and ceilings and arguing that federal preemption applies more naturally to floors than to ceilings); see also Gluck, supra note 4, at 544 (suggesting these regulatory choices could influence statutory interpretation doctrine). responsibility to local agencies, such as school districts, or independent actors.m 9 Courts and commentators can also develop this area of law by thinking about the differences between various doctrines of administrative law. We have argued that the use of state principles regarding agency interpretations of statutes is more likely to create serious problems with uniformity than the use of state principles regarding the standard of review that governs agency action. But a full consideration of this complex issue is not possible in this Note. We hope that this is just the beginning of a conversation on these and other administrative law doctrines.
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While each statute and doctrine presents distinct concerns, Kimbell Foods provides a framework to analyze these issues in an orderly manner that is consistent with the ethos of cooperative federalism. Courts can determine what law to apply by asking whether application of state law would create a significant conflict with federal policies. While this question may not be as simple as it seems, when both state and federal courts start approaching this issue through the same question, we should expect greater consistency in the law, greater respect for state and federal policy needs, and perhaps even a more fruitful dialogue between state and federal courts on administrative law. 2 and federal courts).
